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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 20000556-CA 
JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals an order of the district court dismissing 
an information charging two alternative counts of abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996). At the inception 
of this appeal, the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (a) (1996) . Pursuant 
to the State's suggestion for certification, however, the court 
of appeals certified the case for immediate transfer to this 
Court, pursuant to rule 43(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See addendum A, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Does the Brickev rule, notwithstanding the court of appeals 
interpretation of it in State v. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997 
P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), permit refiling 
1 
in this case, where the record reveals no prosecutorial abuse and 
defendants' right to due process is not implicated? 
Interpretation of caselaw presents a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 
(Utah 1993); State v. Shioler, 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 
1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996), governing abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body, is appended to this brief at 
addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were originally charged, in October of 1996, with 
one count of abuse or desecration of a dead human body for 
disinterring human bones from an archaeological site near Bluff, 
Utah (case #1: 1-2) .l The section under which defendants were 
charged read: 
1
 To provide the Court with all relevant background 
information, the records and transcripts relating to the previous 
case against each defendant (district court case nos. 9617-22 9 
and 9617-230) as well as this case (district court case nos. 
9817-63 and 9817-64) have been designated as part of the record 
on appeal. For simplification, because the cases against both 
defendants arise out of the same facts, because the cases have 
been treated as consolidated both by the parties and the 
appellate courts, and because the records are largely 
duplicative, the State will refer only to the James Redd records, 
citing either to Case #1 (case no. 9617-229) or Case #2 (case no. 
9817-64). Citations from the transcripts associated with each 
case are designated by case number, followed by "Tr." and an 
appellate page number. All other record citations are to the red 
record volumes. 
2 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body if the 
person intentionally and unlawfully: 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise 
interred dead body, without authority of a 
court order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1) (b) (1996) or addendum B.2 
Following a preliminary hearing in March of 1997, the 
magistrate dismissed the charge, reasoning that ancient human 
remains did not constitute a "dead human body" within the meaning 
of the statute (Case #1: 109-11). The State appealed. 
Interpreting the statute for the first time, the court of 
appeals affirmed the dismissal on an alternative ground not 
addressed by the magistrate or briefed by either party. See 
State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 232-33 (Utah App. 1998), rev'd by 
State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986 or addendum C. Focusing 
on the statute's reference to dead bodies "buried or otherwise 
interred," the court of appeals held that, wholly apart from 
proof of disinterment, this phrase required proof that the body 
had been intentionally deposited "into a place designated for its 
repose" as a separate and distinct element of the crime.3 Redd, 
2
 Defendants were also charged with one count of 
trespassing on trust lands, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-30KU (f) (1996) . That charge has been 
consolidated into this case by stipulation but has no bearing on 
this appeal. 
3
 In a later order, the court of appeals articulated that 
u
 [b]ecause defense counsel conceded at oral argument that the 
bone fragments would satisfy the xdead body' requirement of the 
3 
954 P.2d at 234. The court of appeals concluded that although 
the State had adduced evidence that the human remains had been 
"disinterred," it had not adduced independent proof that they had 
previously been "buried or otherwise interred." Based on its sua 
sponte interpretation and articulation of these statutory 
elements, the court of appeals affirmed the magistrate's 
dismissal of the charge.4 
The State filed a petition for rehearing, focusing on a 
single narrow legal issue. Although the resolution of that issue 
has no bearing at this juncture, the court of appeals included a 
footnote in its order denying the petition, specifically warning 
that "[n]o party to this action should construe our opinion or 
this order to preclude the State from refiling the charges under 
the same or a more appropriate subsection of the statute" (Case 
#2: 48 n.2).5 
statute we deemed it unnecessary to, and did not, discuss the 
meaning of that statutory language" (Case #2: 44-45 n.l). 
4
 The court of appeals articulated three elements of the 
crime: 1) "that the dead body at: issue be shown to have been 
placed in a location designated for its repose"; 2) "that a 
defendant unearth or uncover a dead body and remove it from the 
place of interment"; and 3) "that the defendant acted 
intentionally when he or she disinterred the interred dead body." 
Redd, 954 P.2d at 234. 
5
 The court also clarified that its earlier opinion, 
"although upholding the trial court's refusal to bind over the 
defendants, does not hold that disinterring prehistoric bones in 
a proven Anasazi burial site is not a crime under the statute." 
Case #2: 44 (emphasis in original). 
4 
In June of 1998, the State refiled charges against 
defendants (Case #2: 1-2). Taking the court of appeals' apparent 
guidance, the State charged defendants under the original 
statutory subsection as well as an additional subsection that 
specifically referred to "a dead body or any part of it." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1) (a) (emphasis added) . The two charges 
tracked the statutory subsections as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body if the 
person intentionally and unlawfully: 
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report 
the finding of a dead body to a local law 
enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body 
or any part of it; 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise 
interred dead body, without authority of a 
court order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1)(a), (b) (1996) or addendum B. 
The next month, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
case (Case #2: 8-9). Citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986), they argued that refiling should not be permitted because 
the charges were the same and no new evidence had been 
discovered. Defendants contended that where the State had simply 
failed to adduce the evidence necessary to establish probable 
cause for a bindover, good cause for refiling had not been 
established (Case #2: 10-15; 36-42). The parties stipulated that 
the ruling on this motion would be reserved until after the 
preliminary hearing. Id. at 64. 
5 
In October of 1998, at a preliminary hearing on the refiled 
charges, the State adduced evidence addressing "interment," the 
element that the court of appeals had found lacking in the 
earlier preliminary hearing.6 The magistrate then bound 
defendants over on the original charge of disinterring a buried 
or otherwise interred dead body. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
704(1)(b). In so doing, the magistrate stated: 
Were this magistrate to rule on the Brickey 
issue solely on the basis of the language in 
Brickev, he would consider himself compelled 
to prohibit further prosecution of 
defendants. However, the language of 
footnote 2 of the Utah court of appeals [sic] 
order on the state's petition for rehearing 
strongly suggests the creation of an 
additional Brickey exception where the 
prosecutor failed to recognize the need for 
proof of an element of the offense. This 
court takes that language as announcing an 
intention to create such an exception under 
the "other good cause" prong of Brickey and 
accordingly denies defendants' motion to 
dismiss. 
Case #2: 67. 
However, the magistrate did dismiss the new charge of 
"remov[ing], conceal [ing] . . . or destroying] a dead body or 
any part of it." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1)(a). In so doing, 
the magistrate declared: 
There is no evidence that [defendants] 
destroyed, concealed or removed a body or 
6
 The parties stipulated that the magistrate could also 
consider the evidence adduced at the 1997 preliminary hearing 
(Case #2: 64). 
6 
even a bone. The most that can be said is 
that they may have moved as many as seventeen 
bones a few feet. This is not removal, 
concealment or destruction. Count I is 
accordingly dismissed. 
Case #2: 72. 
In response to the dismissal of the "removal" charge, the 
State filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory 
appeal in the court of appeals.7 The court of appeals granted 
the petition and then immediately certified the case to this 
Court (Case #2: 87). This Court held that the State had shown 
probable cause to believe the bones had been "removed," as that 
term is commonly used and that, consequently, defendants should 
have been bound over on the section 76-9-704(1) (a) charge. State 
v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, fll, 992 P.2d 986, or addendum D. 
Accordingly, this Court reversed and remanded the case back to 
district court. Id. at fl6. 
Back in district court on the second information and 
appearing before a different judge,8 defendants filed a motion to 
7
 The sole question of law presented was whether the 
magistrate erred in determining that moving human bones from 
their place of interment could not, as a matter of law, establish 
probable cause to believe the bones had been "remove[d]," as that 
term is used in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1) (a). 
8
 Judge Lyle Anderson recused himself from the case. In 
his capacity as presiding judge of the Seventh Judicial District, 
he assigned juvenile court judge Mary Manley to sit by 
designation. His order states that "[t]his assignment accords 
with the general practice of this district to cross assign 
juvenile and district judges to minimize travel and promote 
judicial economy." Case #2: 150. 
7 
dismiss or to quash the bindover based on Brickey (Case #2: 114). 
They argued that the evidence of interment presented by the State 
at the second preliminary hearing was not new or previously 
unavailable and did not provide good cause for refiling. Id. at 
115-20. In a supplemental memorandum, they argued that an 
opinion issued by the court of appeals in February of 2000, State 
v. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 
1289 (2000) or addendum E, effectively precluded interpreting 
good cause to include an innocent miscalculation of the quantum 
of evidence necessary to obtain a bindover (Case #2: 127-29) . 
The district court, adopting defendants' reasoning, granted 
the motion and dismissed the entire information against 
defendants. The court stated: 
Lack of new evidence and innocent 
miscalculation as to the evidence required to 
obtain a bindover are the two areas that 
Brickey and Morgan together set forth as 
insufficient grounds to permit a refiling of 
charges after dismissal. It is those very 
claims that the state sets forth in this 
case. While the practical application of 
these cases may be unduly restrictive on the 
prosecution, in light of Brickey and Morgan, 
this court is compelled to grant the 
Defendants' Motion. 
Id. at 154 or addendum F. The State now timely appeals from the 
district court's order dismissing the case. Id. at 156-57. 
8 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS9 
On the afternoon of January 6, 1996, Ben Naranjo of the San 
Juan County Sheriff's Office was contacted by dispatch and told 
that Mike Pehrson, a resident of Bluff, wanted to talk to him "as 
soon as possible" (Case #1: Tr. at 69).10 Naranjo immediately 
went to Pehrson's home, where Pehrson informed him that he and 
his stepson, while hiking, had observed several people digging in 
an area known to contain Anasazi ruins (Id. at 70). Erv Guymon, 
who was present when Naranjo arrived and who owned property in 
the area Pehrson described, told Naranjo that "if it was on his 
property, nobody had permission at that time to be on there" 
(IdJ . 
Naranjo, with Pehrson accompanying him, then drove to the 
dig site, located about five miles outside of Bluff, up a dirt 
road in South Cottonwood Canyon (Id. at 70, 82).11 As they 
9
 While the issue before the Court presents a question of 
law only, the State articulates the underlying facts as they were 
adduced at the two preliminary hearings, as a courtesy to the 
Court and to explain the context in which the legal question 
arose. 
10
 For clarity, the hearing transcripts are identified with 
"Tr." preceding the appellate record page number. In contrast to 
the transcript in Case #1, where each transcript page bears an 
appellate page number, the transcript in Case #2 reflects a 
single appellate page number on the cover page. Consequently, it 
will be designated as "Tr. 164" followed by the internal page 
number. 
11
 According to Naranjo, Cottonwood Canyon was generally 
known around Bluff as Guymon's property. The canyon was accessed 
by a single, gated road (Case #1: Tr. at 78). Pehrson lived just 
9 
approached the site, they observed a pickup truck with vanity 
license plates reading "ANASAZI." Three children were standing 
near the vehicle (Id. at 71). Naranjo asked the children if 
there was any digging going on, and they responded that there 
was, but that they were on Erv Guymon's property with his 
permission (Id.). 
Defendants then came running down from the dig site, which 
was located up a little hill, out of sight, and asked Naranjo why 
he was there and what he was doing (Id.). When Naranjo explained . 
that someone had observed them digging, defendants asked for 
details, claiming that Erv Guymon had given them permission some 
three weeks earlier to be on the property (Id. at 72). During 
this conversation, Phil Hall, who ran what defendant James Redd 
described to Naranjo as "that liberal democratic newspaper down 
in Bluff," drove up. Agitated by Hall's presence, defendant said 
to Naranjo, "Get him out of here. I don't want to speak with 
him" (Id. at 73). At this juncture, Naranjo decided to "just 
back off and go talk to Mr. Guymon and ask him about permission 
to be on his property" (Id.).12 Later investigation established 
below the gate (Id. at 79) . 
12
 Despite an earlier statement that no one had permission 
to be on his property (Case #1: Tr. at 70), Erv Guymon later told 
Naranjo that he remembered giving defendants permission to be on 
the land, but not to dig. In any event, Guymon said that he and 
James Redd were friends, and that he would take care of the 
matter (Id. at 74). 
10 
that the dig site was on state land (Id. at 97). 
An archaeologist from the Bureau of Land Management 
described the site and the indications of digging that he 
observed three days after the confrontation with defendants. As 
to the general site, he explained: 
The site itself consisted of a building that 
was about 3 0 feet across and sort of a north-
to-south access with a courtyard in front and 
a kiva to the south, and east of that, a 
midden area. . . . 
(Id. at 100). The archaeologist later explained the meaning and 
significance of the term "midden": 
A midden, in archaeological terms, is that 
part of the site where we find the refuse 
from human activity, whatever has been left 
over from the daily course of life: broken 
pottery, the cleaning out the fire pits, and 
all those other things that regenerates [sic] 
in your daily living activity. . . 
[E]thnographic sources [say] that very often 
burials take place in that midden area, 
because, first of all, it's easy to dig and 
especially with primitive tools . . . areas 
that are soft and easy to dig are very often 
the places - of repose for - humans. The 
second point being that very often deaths, of 
course, take place in the winter time when 
lots of the available ground is frozen and 
even harder to dig, so those soft areas in 
the midden are very much utilized as burials. 
Case #2: Tr. 164: 9, 10; accord id. at 34. The Director of the 
Cultural Preservation Office for the Hopi Tribe, in culturally 
linking the burial practices of his own tribe with the Anasazi, 
observed that even today some Hopi bury their dead in middens. 
Id. at 34. He stated: "When we take a look at past archaeology, 
11 
we find that the practice that Hopi still hold today was indeed 
very common in prehistory times. We find that the areas most 
popular for the burying of deceased a long time ago was in midden 
areas." Id. 
Describing the damage to the midden in this case, the 
archaeologist testified: 
[T]here was a large rectangular hole that had 
been -- been dug into that midden, and the 
resulting back dirt from that excavation was 
piled in the immediate vicinity of the --of 
the hole. 
Case #1: Tr. at 100. He opined that the digging was very recent, 
observing that 
on the back dirt piles . . . where the 
screens had been laid that were. . . used to 
process the dirt[,]. . . [y]ou could still 
see the impressions of . . . the screens on 
the dirt and . . . because . . . no rain had 
taken place, the dirt was very soft . . 
.[and] that kind of information would have 
blown away very quickly. 
Id. at 101. 
The archaeologist testified that he found 13-15 bones, 
"generally within very close proximity to those areas of. . . 
dirt that had been recently screened, as if they had been on 
screen there [sic] and sort of tossed out" (Id. at 103). In 
addition, he observed one human bone fragment "still in the wall 
of the excavated area" (Case #2:: Tr. 164: 13). The archaeologist 
stated, "I felt very strongly that they were human remains" (Case 
#1: Tr. at 103). 
12 
The Hopi witness, describing "the living spiritual 
connection" of his people to their ancestors' final resting 
place, testified: "With our clan connection into this particular 
region and the beliefs associated with death and dying[,] . . . 
the burials that we now encounter are hallowed ground" (Case #2: 
Tr. 164: 35) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case focuses on the propriety of the district court's 
dismissal of refiled charges against defendants. In granting 
defendants' motion to dismiss or quash the bindover, the district 
court relied on this Court's opinion in Brickev and on a recent 
court of appeals opinion, Morgan, which interprets Brickey. 
Morgan, a split decision now before this Court on certiorari 
review, fundamentally alters Brickey by severing the Brickev rule 
from its due process roots. When the Brickey rule and its 
rationale are properly rejoined, the propriety of refiling in 
this case is clear. 
Brickev holds that after a magistrate has dismissed a charge 
for insufficient evidence, state due process forbids refiling 
unless the State can show that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or some other good cause justifies 
refiling. While the instant case does not involve new or 
previously unavailable evidence, it does present "other good 
cause" for refiling. Specifically, where the State innocently 
13 
miscalculated the amount of evidence necessary for a bindover, 
and where a changed circumstance - the articulation of new law by 
an appellate court - arose directly from the dismissal, and where 
defendants' due process rights are not implicated, neither the 
Brickev rule nor the due process rationale underlying it present 
a bar to refiling. 
Morgan, on which the court of appeals relied in dismissing 
the case, is fundamentally flawred because it ignores the due 
process underpinning of the Brickev rule. By casting a net so 
wide as to effectively forbid refiling in cases with no due 
process implications, Morgan undermines the essential guiding 
principle of Brickey and forbids refiling in this case. It would 
thus unnecessarily impair the State's ability and obligation to 
pursue a well-founded criminal prosecution without protecting any 
legitimate due process interests of defendants. 
Fisk represents a better model from which to seek guidance. 
There, the court of appeals not only analyzed whether new or 
previously unavailable evidence or other good cause justified 
refiling, but also engaged in an analysis of whether the refiling 
would violate defendant's right to due process. Finding new 
evidence and no due process infringement, the court determined 
that Brickey would permit refiling. The same result should 
follow here. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE COURT OF 
APPEALS' DECISION IN MORGAN, 
BRICKEY PERMITS THE STATE TO REFILE 
CHARGES WHERE THE RECORD REVEALS NO 
PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE AND WHERE 
DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS 
NOT IMPLICATED 
In dismissing the case against defendants, the trial court 
relied on this Court's decision in State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 6 
(Utah 1986), as interpreted by the court of appeals in State v. 
Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 12 
(Utah 2000). See Case #2: 152-54 or addendum F. The trial 
court's ruling concludes: 
Lack of new evidence and innocent 
miscalculation as to the evidence required to 
obtain a bindover are the two areas that 
Brickev and Morgan together set forth as 
insufficient grounds to permit a refiling of 
charges after dismissal. It is those very 
claims that the state sets forth in this 
case. While the practical application of 
these cases may be unduly restrictive on the 
prosecution, in light of Brickev and Morgan, 
this court is compelled to grant the 
Defendants' Motion. 
Case #2: 154 or addendum F. Morgan, a split decision currently 
before this Court on certiorari review, fundamentally alters 
Brickey by divorcing its limitation on refiling from its 
underlying due process rationale. When the Brickev rule and it 
rationale are properly rejoined, the propriety of refiling in 
this case becomes apparent. 
15 
a. Brickey: The Governing Law 
The law is well settled that a preliminary hearing 
magistrate must dismiss an information and discharge a defendant 
if the State's evidence fails to establish probable cause to 
believe that a defendant has committed the charged crime. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, "[t]he dismissal and discharge do 
not preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution 
for the same offense." Id. Rule 7, then, by its plain language, 
permits refiling as a general proposition. 
Nonetheless, the State's ability to refile a dismissed 
charge is limited by state constitutional due process 
protections. In Brickey, this Court held that after a magistrate 
has dismissed a charge for insufficient evidence, state due 
process forbids refiling the same charge unless the State "can 
show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced, or 
that other good cause justifies refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 
647. Although Brickev did not reach the issue of what might 
constitute "other good cause," it noted that other jurisdictions 
have found that good cause may exist "when a prosecutor 
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to 
obtain a bindover." Id. at 647 n.5 (citing Harper v. District 
Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971)). 
The policies and protections underlying the Brickev rule 
provide guidance in understanding the rule and properly defining 
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its intended ambit. First, in Brickey, this Court noted that 
granting the State unbridled discretion in determining whether to 
refile charges raises the intolerable specter of the State 
continually harassing a defendant who previously had charges 
dismissed for insufficient evidence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-
47. Thus, one important purpose underlying the Brickey rule is 
to protect defendants from intentional prosecutorial harassment 
arising from repeated filings of groundless claims before 
different magistrates in the hope that some magistrate will 
eventually bind defendants over for trial. Id. at 647; accord 
State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah App. 1998)(Brickey rule 
"ensures that the defendant is not harassed by repeated charges 
on tenuous grounds"). 
A second significant purpose inheres in the Brickey dicta 
interpreting "good cause" to include an innocent miscalculation 
of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a 
bindover. Id. at 647 n.5. This language implies an additional 
underlying purpose of preventing the State from intentionally 
holding back crucial evidence in order to impair a defendant's 
pre-trial discovery rights and ambush him at trial with the 
withheld evidence - "sandbagging". 
Overreaching by the State, either by prosecutorial 
harassment in the form of "forum shopping" or "sandbagging," is 
the chief evil to be prevented by the Brickey rule. To the 
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extent that these overzealous practices may infringe on a 
defendant's right to due process, Brickev justifiably limits the 
State's ability to refile charges that have been dismissed for 
insufficient evidence. Brickev, however, does not indicate any 
intent to forbid refiling generally or to preclude refiling where 
a defendant's due process rights are not implicated. The 
lodestar of Brickey, then, is fundamental fairness. 
In delineating grounds for refiling that would comport with 
due process, Brickev adopts the approach taken by Oklahoma: 
[W]hen a charge is refiled, the prosecutor 
must, whenever possible, refile the charges 
before the same magistrate who does not 
consider the matter de novo, but looks at the 
facts to determine whether the new evidence 
or changed circumstances are sufficient to 
require a re-examination and possible 
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing 
the charges. 
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647 (citing with approval Jones v. State, 
481 P.2d 169, 171-72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971)(footnote 
omitted)(emphasis added)). A change in circumstances may thus 
constitute "other good cause" and provide justification for 
refiling charges, if a defendant's due process rights are not 
implicated by the changed circumstances. 
This case falls squarely within the four corners of the 
Brickev rule because it involves both an innocent miscalculation 
of the quantum of evidence necessary for a bindover and a changed 
circumstance, without ever implicating defendants' right to due 
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process. 
First, as to the innocent miscalculation, the original 
preliminary hearing amply demonstrates the "innocent 
miscalculation" not only of the prosecutor, but of defense 
counsel and the magistrate as well. The original preliminary 
hearing and the magistrate's ruling arising out of that hearing 
focused wholly on whether the "human remains" at issue in this 
case came within the ambit of the statutory term Mead human 
body." The State admittedly adduced no evidence of "interment," 
the element later revealed by the court of appeals to be the 
source of the miscalculation. However, where defense counsel did 
not file a motion to dismiss for failure to establish probable 
cause of "interment" and where the magistrate's ruling was 
similarly silent as to that element, strong circumstantial 
evidence supports an innocent miscalculation by everyone in the 
courtroom as to the statutory requirements. That is, the record 
itself objectively supports the "good faith ignorance" of all 
involved. Because the relevant statute had never before been 
construed by an appellate court, no one at the preliminary 
hearing had any idea that "interment" was an element of the crime 
wholly separate and apart from "disinterment." 
Second, a "changed circumstance" justifying refiling arose 
some eleven months after the magistrate originally dismissed the 
case. The "changed circumstance" was the court of appeals' 
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opinion in State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1998) or 
addendum C, which construed the relevant statute and sua sponte 
declared a heretofore unarticulated element of the offense. The 
changed circumstance of new law generated by an appellate court 
in direct response to the earlier dismissal of the case created 
the need for the evidence that the State had not previously 
introduced. 
Finally, as to due process, neither of the concerns on which 
Brickey justifiably focused are implicated here. Plainly, forum-
shopping is not at issue. Both preliminary hearings were held 
before the only magistrate in San Juan County.13 Nor is there 
any evidence to even remotely suggest that the State purposefully 
withheld evidence to harass defendants or to gain some later 
advantage at trial. And, practically speaking, because the 
magistrate had already found probable cause as to two of the 
elements of the crime, the only issue at the second preliminary 
hearing was whether the State could establish probable cause as 
to the newly-articulated third element of the offense. Had the 
State failed to do so, the magistrate would have been compelled 
to dismiss, and the matter would have been definitively 
concluded. Consistent with Brickev, then, permitting refiling in 
13
 Hon. Lyle Anderson, who served as magistrate for both 
preliminary hearings, is also the only district court judge in 
the county. While the case is now under the aegis of a different 
judge, that action was initiated by Judge Anderson, not by the 
State. 
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this case would advance the utility of the preliminary hearing as 
"a screening device to x ferret out . . . groundless and 
improvident prosecutions."' Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting 
State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)). 
The facts of this case plainly do not raise the specter 
either of harassment of defendants through forum-shopping or 
purposeful obfuscation of evidence through sandbagging, the two 
primary abuses against which the Brickey rule protects. Where 
these abuses are not present, and where defendants' due process 
rights are not implicated, Brickey permits refiling of criminal 
charges against defendants. 
b, Morgan: A Flawed Interpretation of Briclcev 
Recently, in State v. Morgan, the court of appeals has set 
the Brickey rule adrift from its due process anchor, broadening 
its scope without regard for the fundamental constitutional 
concern underlying its original formulation. Morgan casts a net 
so broad as to effectively forbid refiling in cases with no due 
process implications. Consequently, Morgan undermines the 
essential guiding principle of the Brickey rule.14 
In Morgan, defendant faced a felony drug charge of 
possession with intent to distribute. While the State had two 
police officers present in court, sworn and ready to testify, it 
14
 This Court granted certiorari in Morgan. See Morgan, 4 
P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). The State is currently preparing the 
brief of appellant. 
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called only the arresting officer. Morgan, 2000 UT App 48, f 2 . 
The magistrate thereafter determined that the evidence was 
insufficient to support an intent to distribute, amended the 
charge to simple possession, and bound defendant over on the 
reduced charge. Id. at 13. The State indicated that it had 
assumed the arresting officer's testimony would be sufficient and 
asked to introduce the testimony of the second officer, who was 
still in the courtroom. The magistrate denied the request 
because he believed the entry of the bindover order terminated 
his jurisdiction. Id. The magistrate then granted the State's 
request to dismiss the charges without prejudice.15 Id. at 1[4. 
The State refiled charges, a second preliminary hearing was held 
before the same magistrate, both witnesses testified, defendant 
was bound over, her counsel moved to quash the bindover, and the 
court denied the motion. Id. at f5. A jury found defendant 
guilty of the felony drug charge. Id. at %6. 
On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the 
testimony of the second officer at the second preliminary hearing 
following dismissal for insufficient evidence was not "new or 
previously unavailable evidence." Id. at 1l4. Because the State 
had simply miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary for a 
15
 The court of appeals notes the inconsistency in the 
magistrate's conflicting positions that entry of the bindover 
terminated his jurisdiction and his later "implicit conclusion" 
that he still retained jurisdiction to dismiss the charges. See 
Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48 at 1(4 n.2. 
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bindover, the case squarely questioned whether an innocent 
miscalculation would suffice as "good cause" for refiling so that 
additional evidence could be presented.16 
The court of appeals first properly acknowledged Bridkey's 
holding that the discovery of "new or previously unavailable 
evidence" or "other good cause" would justify refiling.17 Id. at 
fl5. Morgan then goes on to effectively reject Brickev's 
suggestion that an innocent miscalculation of the quantum of 
evidence necessary for a bindover may in and of itself suffice as 
another subcategory of "good cause" for refiling charges: 
Consequently, until and unless our supreme 
court directs otherwise, the innocent 
miscalculation of the quantum of evidence 
required to obtain a bindover is not grounds 
for refiling the dismissed charges unless new 
or previously unavailable evidence results 
from a nondilatory investigation prompted by 
realization of the miscalculation. 
16
 While the facts of Brickev and Morgan are remarkably 
analogous and while both appellate courts ultimately refused to 
permit refiling, the cases differ in one key respect. The 
prosecutor in Brickev candidly admitted he was forum-shopping, 
while no such overreaching infected Morgan. Thus, Brickey 
implicates due process, while Morgan does not. Compare Brickey, 
714 P.2d at 647 with Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, Jl3. 
17
 Brickev's language makes plain that "good cause" 
represents a broad category, with "new or previously unavailable 
evidence" as but two examples of subcategories that come within 
its ambit. "Other good cause," then, on its face, simply means 
additional subcategories, other than "new evidence" or 
"previously unavailable evidence," that justify refiling. An 
"innocent miscalculation" and "changed circumstances" can be two 
such subcategories of "good cause." Cf. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646-
48. 
23 
Id. at H 16. The court of appeals thus departs from Brickey by 
nullifying an innocent miscalculation as a subcategory of good 
cause. That is, Morgan imposes a narrow requirement that, in 
order to establish an innocent miscalculation, the State must in 
every case produce new or previously unavailable evidence that it 
could not have reasonably discovered earlier. Morgan's linkage 
of an ''innocent miscalculation" with "new or previously 
unavailable evidence" in effect subsumes the former category in 
the latter, since the opinion precludes establishing an innocent 
miscalculation without a showing of new or previously unavailable 
evidence.18 
Morgan's modification of the Brickey rule is flawed by its 
disregard for the due process concerns at the heart of Brickey. 
That is, it would prohibit the State from refiling criminal 
charges under circumstances that do not violate - or even 
implicate - the due process rights of defendants. Morgan would 
thus unnecessarily impair both the State's ability and obligation 
to pursue well-founded criminal prosecutions without protecting 
any legitimate due process interests of defendants. 
18
 At least one other panel of the court of appeals has 
explicitly relied upon the "other good cause" prong of Brickey, 
finding that charges could be refiled, even though there was no 
suggestion in that case that new evidence had been uncovered. See 
State v. Rivera, 871 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on 
other grounds, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995)(finding that the State 
could refile the case if a bindover were reversed for lack of 
evidence and quoting Brickey as indicating that an innocent 
miscalculation of the evidence required for a bindover 
constitutes good cause for refiling). 
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This case provides a compelling example. Here, an 
archaeologist testified at the first preliminary hearing. No one 
disputes that this witness possessed the necessary substantive 
knowledge to fill the evidentiary gap identified eleven months 
later by the court of appeals. The case, therefore, does not 
involve new or previously unavailable evidence. Rather, it 
involves a witness "whose testimony is known at the time and does 
not change in any material way after the initial bindover is 
dismissed." Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48 Hl5. According to Morgan's 
interpretation of Brickey, however, refiling would not be 
permitted in this case because the State's innocent 
miscalculation of the evidence required for a bindover was not 
coupled with the discovery of new or previously unavailable 
evidence. Id. at Kl6. 
Under Morgan's restrictive interpretation of Brickey, 
defendants are permitted to wield Brickey as a sword simply 
because the prosecutor - to say nothing of defendants and the 
magistrate - reasonably construed the statute differently than 
the court of appeals ultimately did. If refiling is not 
permitted and Morgan's interpretation of Brickey prevails, 
defendants will be allowed to escape prosecution on charges for 
which the State plainly had sufficient evidence for at least a 
bindover. See State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah 
1998)(clarifying that the bindover standard is lower even than 
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civil preponderance of evidence standard)(citation omitted). 
Ratifying the court of appeals' broad preclusion of refiling 
fundamentally undermines the Brickev rule by extending it to 
situations that do not implicate a defendant's right to due 
process. Such an interpretation plainly decreases confidence in 
the judicial system, in clear contravention of Brickey. See 
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (promotion of confidence in justice 
system is by-product of preliminary hearing function of ferreting-
out groundless claims). 
c. Fisk: A Better Model 
The district court in this case would have been better 
served by reference to State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 
1998), a factually analogous case articulating a more 
comprehensive Brickev analysis.19 In Fisk, after a preliminary 
hearing, charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence on one 
element of the offense. Fisk, 966 P.2d at 862. Subsequently, a 
key witness testified at another proceeding which, in turn, gave 
rise to expert testimony addressing the missing element. Id. 
The court permitted refiling in Fisk, reasoning that the 
intervening event of the witness testifying at the other 
proceeding created "new evidence" and thus constituted good cause 
19
 While Fisk was actually decided on jurisdictional 
grounds, the opinion nonetheless addresses refiling under 
Brickey. Fisk, 966 P.2d at 863-64. Although dictum, the 
discussion remains instructive as an illustrative factual 
example. 
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justifying refiling. Id. at 864. The court also carefully 
examined the impact of refiling on defendant's right to due 
process. Reviewing the Brickev rule, the court noted that "no 
evidence in the record suggest[ed] that the State refiled the 
charges with the intent of harassing defendant" and that the 
State made "diligent efforts'' to ensure that the second 
preliminary hearing was conducted by the judge who presided over 
the first. Id. Under such circumstances, Brickey presented no 
bar to refiling. 
Similarly, here, Brickev presents no bar to refiling. 
Rather than the intervention of "new evidence," as in Fisk, this 
case presents a "changed circumstance" in the form of newly-
articulated appellate law. Both function as "good cause" 
justifying refiling. Also, just as in Fisk, the record in this 
case is devoid of even a shred of evidence suggesting 
prosecutorial abuse or overreaching. Thus, applying the Brickev 
analysis utilized in Fisk, refiling is also permitted in this 
case. 
Where defendant's due process rights are not implicated, a 
change in circumstances - in this case, the articulation of new 
law by an appellate court - provides ample support for refiling. 
To disallow refiling under the circumstances present here, as the 
district court noted in its ruling dismissing the case, is 
"unduly restrictive on the prosecution." Case #2: 154 or 
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addendum E. The injustice in such a result is especially clear 
because, where the State has neither engaged in forum-shopping 
nor withheld evidence in bad faith, defendants' due process 
rights as protected in Brickev have plainly not been violated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the 
district court order dismissing all charges against defendants 
and remand the case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /SJA^ day of October, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
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JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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FILED 
Utah Court of Appeds 
AUG 2 5 2000 
Paulette Stagq 
Cleric of the Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James Redd and Jeanne Redd, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20000556-CA 
This case is before the court on the State's suggestion of 
certification, submitted pursuant to Rule 43(b)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Based upon the affirmative vote 
of at least four judges of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is certified for 
immediate transfer to the Utah Supreme Court for determination. 
Utah R. App. P. 43(a). 
Dated this 
FOR THE COURT: 
<£* day of August, 2000. 
. Greenwood, 5amela T.
Presiding Judge 
\ 
Addendum B 
76-9-704. Abuse or desecration of a dead human body — 
Penalties. 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of a dead human body if the 
person intentionally and unlawfully: 
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the finding of a dead body to a local 
law enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it; 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred dead body, without author-
ity of a court order, 
(c) dismembers a dead body to any extent, or damages or detaches any 
part or portion of a dead body; or 
(d) commits, or attempts to commit upon any dead body sexual pen-
etration or intercourse, object rape, sodomy, or object sodomy, as these acts 
are described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Person. 
(2) A person does not commit an offense under this section if when he directs 
or carries out procedures regarding a dead human body, he is acting lawfully 
under any of the following provisions: 
(a) Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Service License Act; 
(b) Title 26, Chapter 28, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act; 
(c) Title 26, Chapter 4, Utah Medical Examiner Act; 
(d) Title 58, Chapter 12, Part 5, Utah Medical Practice Act, which 
concerns licensing to practice medicine; 
(e) Title 53B, Chapter 17, Part 3, Use of Dead Bodies for Medical 
Purposes; or 
(f) Title 9, Chapter 8, Part 3, Antiquities. 
(3) Abuse or desecration of a dead human body is a third degree felony 
except failing to report a finding of a human body is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1968,78-8*704, enacted by L. made corrections and changes in the style of the 
1978, eh. 198,1 78-9-704; 1988, eh. 88,1 1; chapter references in Subsections UXd) and (2). 
1991, ch. 341,1 108; 1998,eh.841,1 878. The 1992 amendment, effective March 13, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- 1992, substituted the reforenee to Title 9, Chap-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted ter 8, Part 3 for a reference to H 63-18-18 
"class B" for 'class A" m Subeeetion (3) end through 63-18-31 in Subsection (2Xf). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jon Sd.-22AAa.Jw. 2d Deal Bodies 
f 109. 
CAS.-28AOJ.& Deed Bodice | 10. Afrft _ Construction sad application of 
grave-robbing eUtulee, 62 AXJtSd 701. 
Liability for dceccratiea of graves and tomb-
stones, 77 AXJUth 108. 
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Addendum C 
954 P.2d 230 
337 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
(Cite as: 954 P.2d 230) 
Pagel 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James REDD and Jeanne Redd, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 970275-CA. 
Feb. 20, 1998. 
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1998. 
At preliminary hearing, two separate informations 
that alleged defendants abused or desecrated dead 
human bodies were dismissed by the Seventh District 
Court, Monticello Department, Lyle R. Anderson, J. 
State appealed and appeals were consolidated. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that informations 
were properly dismissed where no evidence existed to 
support conclusion that there was probable cause that 
bones or bone fragments removed by defendants were 
interred. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Criminal Law <®=»1139 
110kll39 
Although lower court may enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, ultimate decision of whether to 
bind defendant over for trial presents question of law 
which Court of Appeals reviews de novo without 
deference. 
(2J Criminal Law <@=»240 
110k240 
Although review of bind over decision is based upon 
correctness standard, reviewing court should give 
some deference to magistrate's factual findings when 
issues of credibility and demeanor of witnesses are 
important to finding probable cause. 
[31 Dead Bodies <@=»7 
116k7 
To prove prima facie case for intentionally and 
unlawfully disinterring buried or otherwise interred 
dead body, without court order, State must prove 
three elements: that dead body involved in crime was 
buried or otherwise interred, that defendant 
disinterred body, and that defendant acted 
intentionally when he or she disinterred interred dead 
body. U.C.A.1953, 76-9-704(1 )(b). 
[4] Statutes <@=* 188 
361kl88 
When statute fails to define word, interpreting court 
relies on dictionary to divine usual meaning. 
[5] Dead Bodies <@=*7 
116k7 
Term "inter" in statute prohibiting intentional and 
unlawful disinterring of buried other otherwise 
interred dead body, without court order, requires that 
dead body at issue be shown to have been placed in 
location designated for its repose. U.C.A.1953, 
76-9-704(l)(b). 
[6] Dead Bodies <&=>7 
116k7 
Term "disinter" in statute prohibiting intentional and 
unlawful disinterring of buried other otherwise 
interred dead body, without court order, requires that 
defendant unearth or uncover dead body and remove 
it from place of internment. U.C.A.1953, 
76-9-704(l)(b). 
[7] Statutes <@=>206 
361k206 
Any interpretation of statutory language that would 
nullify other statutory provisions is improper. 
[8] Dead Bodies <&=>7 
116k7 
In enacting statute prohibiting intentional and 
unlawful disinterring of buried or otherwise interred 
dead body, without court order, legislature intended 
this statute to prohibit disinterment only of dead 
bodies shown to have been intentionally deposited in 
place of repose. U.C.A.1953, 76-9- 704(l)(b). 
[9] Dead Bodies <®^7 
116k7 
Sole fact that bones unearthed by defendants were 
underground, in midden area at an ancient dwelling 
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
954 P 2d 230 
(Cite as: 954 P.2d 230) 
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site, when found did not raise reasonable inference 
that bones were intentionally deposited in earth for 
purpose of placing them in repose so that their 
removal would constitute disinterment under statute, 
and thus, State failed to establish essential element of 
crime of intentionally and unlawfully disinterring 
buried or otherwise interred dead body U C A 1953, 
76-9-704(1 )(b) 
[101 Criminal Law <®=>238(1) 
110k238(l) 
In making determination as to probable cause, 
magistrate should view evidence in light most 
favorable to prosecution and resolve all inferences in 
favor of prosecution 
[11] Criminal Law <@=>238(1) 
110k238(l) 
Unless evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove some issue which 
supports prosecution's claim, magistrate should bmd 
defendant over for trial. 
[12] Criminal Law <®=>304(1) 
110k304(l) 
Exceptional circumstances did not exist justifying 
departure from normal reservation of taking judicial 
notice of fact when motion to so is made first time on 
appeal, and thus, Court of Appeals refused to take 
judicial notice of fact that Anasazi cultures often used 
midden areas to bury their dead, in prosecution for 
abuse or desecration of dead human bodies, as this 
type of fact was not one normally subject to judicial 
notice and was not generally known fact nor one 
capable of accurate and ready determination. 
UCA.1953, 76-9- 704(l)(b); Rules of Evid., Rule 
201. 
[131 Criminal Law <@=>1134(6) 
HOkl 134(6) 
Appellate court may affirm lower court's ruling on 
any proper grounds, even though lower court relied 
on some other ground. 
*231 Jan Graham and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake 
City, and William L. Benge, Moab, for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
William L Schultz, Moab and Rod W Snow, 
Denver, CO, for Defendants and Appellees. 
Before DAVIS, P J , and BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge 
The State appeals the dismissal at the preliminary 
hearing of the counts in two separate informations 
alleging that James and Jeanne Redd abused or 
desecrated dead human bodies, third degree felonies, 
m violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(b) 
(1995). The appeals were consolidated. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 6, 1996, a hiker witnessed several people 
diggmg in an area of San Juan County known to 
contam Anasazi ruins. He contacted the San Juan 
County Sheriffs office and told the office that he 
wished to speak to Officer Ben Naranjo "as soon as 
possible." When Naranjo arrived at the witness's 
home, he told Naranjo that he saw people diggmg at 
the site on that day and on several previous occasions. 
Erv Guymon, who was at the witness's home when 
Naranjo arrived and who owned property near the site 
described by the witness, told Naranjo "if [the 
diggmg] was on his property, nobody had permission 
at that tune to be on [it]." 
Naranjo, accompanied by the witness, then drove to 
the dig site. On then: way, they noticed a truck with 
three children standing nearby. Naranjo asked the 
children if they knew of any diggmg at the nearby 
site. The children answered that there was diggmg, 
but that they had permission from Guymon to be on 
the property. 
At about the same time, defendants, James and 
Jeanne Redd (the Redds), ran to Naranjo from the dig 
site, which was up a hill away from Naranjo and the 
children. The Redds asked Naranjo why he was 
there. After *232 Naranjo explamed that a witness 
had observed them diggmg, the Redds asserted that 
they had Guymon's permission to dig at the site. 
During the conversation, a local newspaper editor 
arrived. Because of Mr. Redd's agitation over the 
editor's presence and the Redds' claim that they had 
Guymon's permission to be there, Naranjo decided to 
"just back off and go talk to Mr. Guymon." Guymon 
later recalled givmg the Redds permission to be on 
his property but did not recall givmg them permission 
to dig at the site. 
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The next day, Naranjo, another county sheriff 
deputy, and James Ragsdale, a law enforcement 
officer with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 
returned to the site to take pictures but did not collect 
any other evidence At that time Ragsdale observed 
that there had been recent digging at the site 
On January 10, 1996, Ragsdale returned to the dig 
site with the San Juan County surveyor, a BLM soil 
specialist, San Juan County Sheriff Mike Lacy, and 
Dale Davidson, a BLM archaeologist. Davidson 
descnbed the site as follows 
The site itself consisted of a building that was 
about 30 feet across and sort of a north-to-south 
access with a courtyard in front and a kiva[ 
[FN1]] to the south, and east of that, a midden 
area[ [FN2]] and there was a large rectangular 
hole that had been-been dug into that midden, 
and resultmg back dirt from that excavation was 
piled in the immediate vicinity of the . . hole. 
FN1 We understand a kiva to be a circular 
ceremonial structure usually located 
partially underground 
FN2 We understand a midden area to be an 
area where refuse or garbage is piled. 
Although the State moved that we take 
judicial notice that midden areas are known 
as Anasazi bunal sites, we decline to do so. 
See infra note 7. 
The county surveyor determined that, although 
incorrectly noted as pnvate land on a BLM map, the 
site was on state land. Davidson believed the 
diggmg was very recent and found thirteen to fifteen 
bones he "felt very strongly" were human. The 
bones were found "generally within very close 
proximity to those areas of ... dirt that had been 
recently screened, as if they had been on [the] screen 
and... [then] tossed out" 
Based on the investigation, the Redds were both 
charged with one count of abuse or desecration of a 
dead human body, a third degree felony, m violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(b) (1995) [FN3] 
and one count of trespassing on trust land, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
53C-2-301(l)(f) (Supp.1997). [FN4] After a 
preliminary hearing on the matter, the lower court 
made the following oral findings and conclusions: 
FN3 Although the informations charge the 
Redds with a violation of section 
76-9-704(1) generally, it cites only factual 
contentions supporting a charge under 
section 76-9-704(1 )(b) 
FN4 We cite to the recently amended 
statute because, as it relates to this case, 
there is no difference between the statute as 
amended and the previous codification 
From the evidence that's been presented here, I 
find that there is probable cause to believe that 
the defendantf ]s did trespass on state trust lands, 
I also find probable cause to believe that they 
did disturb these-or even disinterred these 
remains Whether that constitutes a criminal 
offense of desecration of a corpse, or abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body is what's 
addressed in the defendant's [m]emorandum[,] 
and these are remains that presumably are a 
thousand years old. I guess there's one school of 
thought that it doesn't matter how old the remains 
are, they're still human remains, and they need to 
be protected from bemg disturbed. Under that 
theory, if these had been on Mr. Guymon's 
property they would have been~it would not 
[have] been ... permissible to disturb them, and 
I'm thinking of all the farmers that have run then-
plows across lands and ... disturbed human 
remains. [However,] these are human remains 
that are entitled to respect, these . people 
probably have descendants living today who care 
that they be treated with respect. The 
[descendants] of these people probably are the 
Pueblo Indians, if... any descendants exist. 
*233 The other school of thought is, "Hey wait a 
minute, you know, there's a rule of reason that has 
to apply here, we're talking about disturbing 
human remains that have been buried in a place 
that's been set aside for the preserving of human 
remains, the cemetery[,] and there has to be a 
certain point when we can't .. hold people guilty 
.. of a Third Degree Felony because they ... don't 
avoid all of these human remainsf,] and ... these 
remains are scattered all over this part of the 
country. I presume all over the world this 
situation exists. 
And I don't know-really I don't know the answer 
to the question. There's these two philosophies, 
both of them entitled to respect. But, I have to 
decide as a magistrate, whether I will bmd over 
and hold ... the Redd[ ]s for trial on these 
charges.... 
And this is a statute that as you read the statute in 
it[ ]s entirety, I think . clearly evidences a 
legislative mtent to keep the people from diggmg 
around in graveyards. You [must] report the 
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body, you can't disinter it or, you can't dismember 
it or damage it You can't commit any of these 
unspeakable acts on a dead body 
And so I am not gomg to bind over on the 
felony charges, I will dismiss those charges and 
while indicating as I have my factual findings are 
that they did disinter these remains And if that 
amounts to this offense, then this case should be 
sent back for trial, and I should be reversed and 
ordered to bind the defendantf ]s over 
The lower court then entered written findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order The findings and 
order provided 
1 Probable cause is found as to the trespass 
count 
2 The state presented evidence that defendants, 
in the process of searching for arch[a]eological 
artifacts, disturbed human bones and bone 
fragments The state has not shown that the 
bones were in their original place of repose 
before they were disturbed by defendants 
3 The legislature has addressed the excavation of 
artifacts and human remains m Title 9, Chapters] 
8 and 9, Utah Code (1996), and carefully avoided 
regulating, without the owner's consent, the 
excavation of artifacts and human remains on 
private property 
4 The section under which defendants are 
charged with desecration of a corpse does not 
define "bunalf,"] "interment" or "deadbodyf "] 
5 Title 9, Chapter 9, Utah Code (1996) refers to 
portions of an individual that are found in 
archaeological sites as "remains["] 
6 Reading Section 76-9-704 and Title 9, 
Chapters 8 [and] 9 together, the court concludes 
that in the eyes of the legislature, some time after 
a person is buried and one thousand years later, a 
"dead body" becomes "remains[ "] 
7 The statute clearly evidences a legislative 
mtent to avoid regulation of private excavation of 
archaeological sites on pnvate land unless the 
owner has consented to regulation. 
8 The interpretation argued by the state in this 
case would extend Section 76-9-704 to all pnvate 
lands in Utah, contrary to legislative intent, and 
make it a felony for pnvate persons to disturb one 
thousand year old remains on their own lands 
9 With the consent of defendants, the 
misdemeanor trespass is held m abeyance for six 
months, for a status hearing as to the felony, 
which this Court refuses to bmd over for tnal for 
the reasons herein stated 
The lower court then ordered that the charge of 
abuse or desecration of a dead human body be 
dismissed 
The State filed this appeal 
ISSUE 
The sole issue for review is whether the lower court 
erred when it dismissed at the preliminary hearing the 
charges against the Redds for abuse or desecration of 
a dead human body 
ANALYSIS 
[1][2] Although a lower court "may enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law , *234 the ultimate 
decision of whether to bind a defendant over for trial 
presents a question of law which we review de novo 
without deference " State v Jaeger, 896 P 2d 42, 44 
(Utah Ct App 1995) (citations omitted), accord State 
v Wodskow, 896 P2d 29, 31 (Utah CtApp 1995) 
Although the review of a bind over decision is based 
upon a correctness standard, "[the reviewing court] 
should give some deference to a magistrate's factual 
findings when the issues of credibility and the 
demeanor of the witnesses are important to finding 
probable cause " Wodskow, 896 P 2d at 32 
[3] The State charged the Redds under Utah Code 
Ann § 76-9- 704(l)(b) (1995) with "intentionally and 
unlawfully disinterfnng] a buned or otherwise 
interred dead body, without authonty of a court 
order" To prove a prima facie case under this 
subsection, the State must prove three elements 
[4][5] First, the State must show that the dead body 
involved in the crime was "buned or otherwise 
interred " In interpreting a statute we " 'give the 
words their usual and accepted meaning' " Gull 
Labs, Inc v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 936 P 2d 
1082, 1084 (Utah CtApp 1997) (citation omitted) 
When a statute fails to define a word, "we rely on the 
dictionary to divine the 'usual meaning' " Id at 1084 
(citing Morton Int'l, Inc v Auditing Div of Utah Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991)) The 
statute involved in this case does not define the word 
"inter" Accordmgly, we look to dictionanes for 
assistance Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1176 (1986) defines "inter" to mean "to 
deposit (a dead body) in the earth or m a grave or 
tomb " Similarly, Amencan Hentage Dictionary 669 
(2d ed 1985) defines "inter" as "[t]o place in a grave 
or a tomb " A review of these definitions indicates 
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that the usual meaning of "inter" connotes the 
intentional placement of a dead body into a place 
designated for its repose Consequently, when the 
statute requires that there be a disinterment of a 
"buried or otherwise interred dead body," it requires 
that the dead body at issue be shown to have been 
placed in a location designated for its repose 
Although in some cases it may be difficult to prove 
that a dead body was placed with the purpose of 
interring it, such as when the bodies or grave sites are 
ancient and unmarked, when a body is removed from 
a cemetery, clearly marked grave site, or from a 
burial mound, there is clear evidence that the body 
was placed in the site precisely for the purpose 
contemplated by this requirement of the statute 
[6] Second, the State must show that the defendant 
disinterred the body Again, because the statute fails 
to define the term "disinter," we look to the dictionary 
definition to find its usual and accepted meaning 
"Disinter" has been defined to mean "to take out of 
the grave or tomb[,] to dig up[,] EXHUME," 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 650 (1986), and 
as "[t]o exhume, unbury, take out of the grave," 
Black's Law Dictionary 468 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, the 
usual meaning of disinter connotes some removal of a 
body from a place of interment, rest, or repose. 
Although the Redds contend that disinterment means 
removal from the place of original repose, the usual 
meaning of the term clearly does not place such a 
restriction on the word. The statute requires only 
that a defendant unearth or uncover a dead body and 
remove it from the place of interment. 
Finally, the State must also prove that the defendant 
acted intentionally when he or she disinterred the 
interred dead body. 
[7] The State apparently does not agree that the first 
element is independent of the second. It argues that 
the lower court properly concluded that probable 
cause existed as to all the factual elements under this 
subsection when the court simply noted that the bones 
and bone fragments had been "disinterred." 
However, "[w]e ... assume the Legislature carefully 
and advisedly chose the statute's words and phrases." 
DeLand v Uintah County, 945 P 2d 172, 174 (Utah 
CtApp 1997) Additionally, we adhere to the 
principle that 
[a] statute is passed as a whole and not m parts or 
sections and is animated by one general purpose 
and intent. Consequently, each part or section 
should be construed in connection with every 
other part or section so as to produce a 
harmonious whole Thus, it is not proper to 
confine *235 interpretation to the one section to 
be construed [W]hen interpreting a statute all 
parts must be construed together without 
accordmg undue importance to a single or 
isolated portion 
2A Norman J Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 46 05, at 103 (5th ed 1992) (footnotes 
omitted); see Nixon v Salt Lake City Corp, 898 
P2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995) ("[W]e note that an 
equally important rule of statutory construction is that 
a statute should be construed as a whole, with all of 
its provisions construed to be harmonious with each 
other and with the overall legislative objective of the 
statute."), Gull Labs , 936 P 2d at 1085 (construing 
word's dictionary definition "in harmony with the 
general theme of the other subsections"), State v 
Scieszka, 897 P2d 1224, 1227 (Utah CtApp 1995) 
(stating "a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation 
requires that a statute Tje looked at in its entirety and 
in accordance with the purpose which was sought to 
be accomplished* " (citation omitted)) Thus, any 
interpretation of statutory language that would nullify 
other statutory provisions is improper See Downey 
State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P 2d 1286, 
1288 (Utah 1978) (finding improper interpretation of 
statutory language that "would make phrases 
surplusage and meaningless"); Ferro v Utah Dep't of 
Commerce, 828 P2d 507, 513-14 (Utah 
CtApp. 1992) (finding proposed interpretation of 
statute improper because it would "impermissibly 
render [a statutory] provision a complete nullity") 
[8] If we were to interpret section 76-9-704(1 )(b) to 
include the removal of any dead body without 
reference to whether it was interred, we would clearly 
violate these canons of statutory construction. We 
presume that when the Legislature chose the terms 
"disinter" and "inter" in its prohibitions, it intended to 
use both terms as they are normally understood. 
Accordingly, we must conclude that the Legislature 
intended this subsection to prohibit the disinterment 
only of dead bodies shown to have been intentionally 
deposited m a place of repose Further, any 
interpretation that would eliminate the interment 
requirement would render the language of subsection 
76-9-704(1 )(a), which specifically prohibits the 
removal or destruction of any dead body, mere 
surplusage. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(a) 
(1995) (prohibiting "intentionally and unlawfully 
remov[ing] . or destroy[ing] a dead body or any part 
of it"). 
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We now turn our attention to the Redds' arguments. 
They contend that the lower court made a factual 
finding in paragraph two of its written order that the 
Redds did not disinter a dead body. Thus, the Redds 
argue that we are bound by that finding and cannot 
look to the lower court's oral decision to contradict 
that finding. We note first that we disagree with the 
characterization that paragraph two declares the State 
did not prove disinterment. [FN5] We conclude that 
the written order is at best ambiguous and that the 
lower court's oral statements make clear that the 
lower court concluded that probable cause as to the 
second element, disinterment, had been met. 
Nonetheless, as discussed above, the lower court's 
statements reflect a legal conclusion that is not 
entitled to deference. 
FN5. Although the Redds claim that 
paragraph two of the written findings and 
order conclusively determined there was no 
disinterment because it declared that the 
State had not shown that the bones were in 
their original place of repose, paragraph two 
is ambiguous as it relates to the question of 
disinterment. Since disinterment does not 
depend upon evidence that a body was in its 
original place of repose, and paragraph two 
states that the bones were "disturbed," it is 
far from clear to us that the lower court 
concluded that the bones had not been 
disinterred. 
[9][10][11][12][13] However, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, [FN6] there was no evidence presented 
*236 at the preliminary hearing which would support 
the first required element that the bones and bone 
fragments involved in this case had been interred. 
The evidence and any inferences from the evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing show only that 
the bones were unearthed from a midden area at an 
ancient dwelling site. [FN7] The State called no 
witnesses, expert or otherwise, to establish that these 
bones were intentionally deposited in the earth in a 
place of repose. Although in other cases an 
inference of interment might arise where bones are 
found in the ground, such as when bones are found 
along with metal hinges similar to those found on 
coffins or where the bones are found in a place known 
to be used for burial of bodies, the sole fact that 
bones are underground when found does not raise a 
reasonable inference that the bones were intentionally 
deposited in the earth for the purpose of placing them 
in repose. The State must show more to raise such 
an inference. Thus, m this case, the State failed to 
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to submit the 
case to a trier of fact on an essential element of the 
crime charged. Accordingly, we affirm the lower 
court's dismissal of the informations. [FN8] 
FN6 Preliminary hearings are adversarial 
proceedings in which the prosecution must 
present sufficient evidence to establish that 
"the crime charged has been committed and 
that the defendant has committed it." "The 
prosecution is not required to introduce 
enough evidence to establish the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must 
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to 
warrant submission of the case to the trier of 
fact." In making a determination as to 
probable cause, the magistrate should view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in 
favor of the prosecution Moreover, 
"[u]nless the evidence is wholly lacking and 
incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim," the magistrate 
should bind the defendant over for trial. 
State v. Pledger, 896 P 2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995) (citations omitted). 
FN7. During oral argument, the State urged 
us, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, to take judicial notice of the 
fact that Anasazi cultures often used midden 
areas to bury their dead. However, the 
State never moved for the lower court to 
take judicial notice of this fact. In Trimble 
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 
P 2d 451 (Utah Ct.App.1988), we held that, 
except in exceptional circumstances, we 
would normally refuse to take judicial 
notice of a fact when such a motion is 
made for the first time on appeal. See 
id. at 456. The State presented no 
"compelling 'countervailing principle' " 
that would overcome our normal 
reluctance to take judicial notice in 
these circumstances. See id. 
(discussing sufficiently compelling 
reasons to justify taking judicial notice 
when motion was made for first tune 
on appeal). Because we can see no 
exceptional circumstance justifying a 
departure from our normal reservation, 
and because we otherwise conclude 
that this type of fact is not one 
normally subject to judicial notice-it 
certainly is not a "generally known" 
fact nor one "capable of accurate and 
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ready determination"-we decline to 
take judicial notice as requested by the 
State. 
FN8 Because we have concluded that the 
evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing did not support a bind over on a 
charge brought pursuant to section 
76-9-704(1 )(b), we need not consider 
whether bones and bone fragments 
unconnected to and not identifiable as a 
dead body can be considered a "dead body" 
under the statute We also need not 
consider the related argument that the 
statute does not apply to the recovery of 
ancient dead bodies, I e, that sufficiently 
old bodies are not "dead bodies" but 
"remains," the recovery of which are 
governed by other statutes, see, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 to -307 (1996 & 
Supp.1997) (Utah Antiquities Act); id. 
§§ 9-9-401 to -406 (Native American 
Grave Protection and Repatriation 
Act). We note that, even though the lower 
court relied on its statutory interpretation of 
the term "dead body" to dismiss the 
information, "[i]t is well settled that an 
appellate court may affirm a lower court's 
ruling on any proper grounds, even though 
the lower court relied on some other 
ground." DeBry v Noble, 889 P 2d 428, 
444 (Utah 1995) 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the lower court correctly dismissed 
the informations. Because no evidence was presented 
at the preliminary hearing that the bones or bone 
fragments removed from the midden area were 
intentionally deposited there to place them in final 
repose, no evidence existed that could support a 
conclusion that there was probable cause that the 
bones were interred. Accordingly, we affirm the 
lower court's orders dismissing the charges of abuse 
or desecration of a dead human body. 
DAVIS, P J., and BILLINGS, J., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
James and Jeanne REDD, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 981747. 
Dec. 28, 1999. 
The Seventh District Court, Monticello Department, 
Lyle R. Anderson, J., dismissed informations that 
alleged defendants abused or desecrated dead human 
bodies by disinterring dead bodies at dig site known 
to have Anasazi ruins. The Court of Appeals, 954 
P.2d 230, held that informations were properly 
dismissed in absence of evidence that bones or bone 
fragments removed by defendants had been interred. 
Defendants were recharged with original offense and 
with removal, concealment, or failure to report 
finding of dead body or destruction of dead body. 
Following preliminary hearing, the Seventh District 
Court, San Juan County, Lyle R. Anderson, J., 
dismissed new charges and issued bindover on 
original charges. State took interlocutory appeal. The 
Court of Appeals certified case. The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) moving bones to back 
dirt pile at site was "removal" within statute, and (2) 
statute protected partial remains as well as intact 
bodies. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Courts <®=>487(1) 
106k487(l) 
In certifying case for immediate transfer to Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeals was not permitted to add 
issues to certification not present in case before it, 
and thus, where only issue appealed by State was 
dismissal of new charge of removal, concealment, or 
destruction of a dead body or any part of it, issue of 
whether refiling of other charges was merited by 
evidence and whether refiling violated due process 
principles of Brickey was not before Supreme Court. 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 43(a); U.C.A.1953, 
76-9-704(l)(a)(1998). 
[21 Criminal Law <®=>1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
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The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness, according no 
deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion. 
[3] Dead Bodies <@=>7 
116k7 
Defendants, in digging at site of Anasazi runs, 
"removed a dead body," within meaning of criminal 
statute, when they took bones out of ground and move 
them to back dirt piles. U.C.A.1953, 76-9-704(1 )(a) 
(1998). 
[4) Dead Bodies <@=*7 
116k7 
Statute prohibiting the removal, concealment, failure 
to report finding of a dead body to a local law 
enforcement agency, or "destruction of a dead body 
or any part of it" reaches the removal, concealment, 
or failure to report the finding of parts of bodies, such 
as heads, torsos, arms, legs, bones, or organs. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-9-704(1 )(a) (1998). 
[5) Statutes <®=> 181(2) 
361kl81(2) 
[51 Statutes <®=»212.7 
361k212.7 
Where Supreme Court is faced with two alternative 
readings of statute, and has reliable sources that 
clearly fix the legislative purpose, Court looks to the 
consequences of those readings to determine the 
meaning to be given the statute, with clear preference 
for reading that reflects sound public policy, as Court 
presumes that must be what the legislature intended. 
[6] Statutes <§=>181(2) 
361kl81(2) 
Court interprets a statute to avoid absurd 
consequences. 
[71 Dead Bodies <®=»7 
116k7 
Defendants' alleged conduct of excavating human 
bones at Anasazi site and discarding bones in back 
dirt piles at site was within statute prohibiting the 
removal, concealment, failure to report finding of a 
dead body to a local law enforcement agency, or 
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"destruction of a dead body or any part of it," as 
statute applied to body parts as well as whole bodies 
U C A 1953, 76-9- 704(1 )(a) (1998) 
*987 Jan Graham, Att'y Gen, Joanne C Slotmk, 
Asst Att'y Gen, Salt Lake City, and William L 
Benge, Moab, for plaintiff 
Walter F Bugden, Jr, Salt Lake City, William L 
Schultz, Moab, and Rod W Snow, Denver, 
Colorado, for defendants 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice 
K 1 The State of Utah appeals from a magistrate's 
dismissal of a charge against James and Jeanne Redd 
for violating section 76-9-704(1 )(a) of the Code by 
the removal, concealment, or failure to report the 
finding of a dead body to a local law enforcement 
agency, or destruction of a dead body or any part of 
it [FN1] We agree with the State that the magistrate 
erred in his interpretation of the statute by concluding 
that the facts alleged did not constitute a violation, 
and in dismissing the charges We reverse and 
remand for actions consistent with this opinion. 
FN I The court of appeals certified this case 
to this court pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which 
provides "In any case over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction, the court may certify a case 
for immediate transfer to the Supreme 
Court for determination" Utah 
RApp P 43(a) We assume 
jurisdiction under section 78-2-2(3)(b) 
and(5)oftheUtahCode 
*988 H 2 For clarity, we explain the entire history of 
this case In January of 1996, Ben Naranjo of the 
San Juan County Sheriff s Department was contacted 
by Mike Pehrson, a resident of Bluff, Utah. Pehrson 
informed Naranjo that he had witnessed several 
people digging in an area known to have Anasazi 
ruins Naranjo drove close to the dig site where he 
saw the Redds They asked Naranjo what he was 
doing there He responded that someone had 
observed them digging in the area. 
U 3 James Redd ("James") stated that they were on 
Erv Guymon's property and that Guymon had given 
them permission to be there Naranjo spoke with 
Guymon who said that the Redds did have permission 
to be on the property but not to dig Guymon said 
that he would handle the problem with the Redds 
personally Despite James* claim that he was on 
Guymon's property, Naranjo decided to verify 
ownership of the dig site A survey was conducted 
and it was determined that the site was on state land 
The San Juan County Sheriff then called in Dale 
Davidson, an archaeologist, to examine the site 
% 4 In October of 1996, the Redds were charged with 
abuse or desecration of a dead human body, in 
violation of 76-9-704(1 )(b) [FN2] A preliminary 
hearing was held in March of 1997 Davidson, the 
archaeologist, testified that the Redds had dug in an 
archaeological site, which included a kiva, a building, 
and a midden area. Davidson also testified that the 
site had been altered and damaged by recent digging 
He stated that he found human bones in the wall of 
the excavated area, as well as in a pile of dirt 
discarded dunng the excavation He also testified 
that it appeared that the persons digging had 
excavated a portion of the human remains and 
discarded them after screening the dirt in which they 
were buried. 
FN2 Section 76-9-704( 1 )(b) reads 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body if the 
person intentionally and unlawfully 
(b) disinters a buried or otherwise interred 
dead body, without authority of a court 
order 
Utah Code Ann § 76-9-704(1 )(b) (1995) 
In 1999, the legislature amended section 
76-9-704 It added a new subsection which 
reads 'For purposes of this section, dead 
human bod/ includes any part of a human 
body in any stage of decomposition 
including ancient human remains" Id § 
76-9-704(1) (1999) However, we apply 
the law as it existed at the time of the crime 
charged 
Defendants were also charged with 
trespassing on trust lands, in violation of 
section 53C-2-301(l)(f) of the Code 
Defendants were bound over on the 
trespassing charge, this charge was 
later refiled and no appeal of the 
charge has been taken 
H 5 The magistrate dismissed the charge of abuse or 
desecration of a dead human body He made factual 
findings that the Redds did disinter remains 
However, he was uncertain about whether disinterring 
remains which "presumably are a thousand years old" 
"constitutes a criminal offense of desecration of a 
corpse, or abuse or desecration of a dead human 
body " [FN3] Therefore, he dismissed the charges, 
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stating that the appellate court could clarify whether 
the law was meant to apply to these facts 
FN3 The magistrate said that there are two 
schools of thought regarding the appropriate 
reach of the statute one adheres to the 
position "that it doesn't matter how old the 
remains are, they're still human remains, 
and they need to be protected from being 
disturbed The other school of thought is, 
'Hey wait a minute, you know, there's a rule 
of reason that has to apply here, [the statute 
is] talking about disturbing human remains 
that have been buried in a place that's been 
set aside for the preserving of human 
remains, the cemetery [T]hese [Anasazi] 
remains are scattered all over this part of the 
country'" 
% 6 The State appealed the magistrate's decision to 
the Utah Court of Appeals At oral argument before 
the court of appeals, the Redds' attorney conceded 
that the bones the Redds had removed constitute a 
"dead body" as defined by the statute The court of 
appeals upheld the magistrate's dismissal on 
alternative grounds not addressed by the magistrate or 
briefed by the parties. It reasoned that the statute 
refers only to dead bodies "buried or otherwise 
interred" and that this meant that one element of the 
crime was proof that the body had been intentionally 
placed "into a place designated for its repose." State 
v Redd, 954 P2d 230, 234 (Utah CtAppl998). 
The court of appeals *989 held that the State had 
failed to prove that element of the charged crime. 
The State petitioned for a rehearing, contendmg that 
the court should have taken judicial notice of the fact 
that midden areas were used as burial grounds by the 
Anasazi. The court of appeals refused to take 
judicial notice of this fact. It stated, however, "[n]o 
party to this action should construe our opinion or 
this order to preclude the State from refiling the 
charges under the same or a more appropriate 
subsection of the statute." 
K 7 The State followed the suggestion of the court of 
appeals and refiled the charges against the Redds 
under section 76-9-704(1 )(b). Additionally, it charged 
the Redds under section 76-9-704(1 )(a). It alleged 
that the Redds "did intentionally and unlawfully 
remove, conceal, fail to report the finding of a dead 
body to a local law enforcement agency, or destroy a 
dead body or any part of it," and that they "did 
intentionally and unlawfully disinter a buried or 
otherwise interred dead body, without authority of a 
court order" The State offered new testimony from 
Davidson, the archaeologist, regarding burial 
practices of the Anasazi to support these refiled 
charges The Redds moved to dismiss the refiled 
charges, asserting that their due process rights were 
being violated They relied on State v Bnckey, 714 
P 2d 644 (Utah 1986), arguing that the "good cause" 
showing Bnckey requires as a precondition for the 
refiling of dismissed charges exists only when the 
State has new or previously-unavailable evidence 
They asserted that no such evidence existed 
Everything Davidson would say was known and 
available to the State when the first charges were 
filed. The State responded that it could not have 
foreseen the need for Davidson's additional testimony 
until the court of appeals, sua sponte, added an 
element to the crime The parties stipulated that a 
ruling on the Bnckey motion would be reserved until 
after the preliminary heanng 
f 8 A preliminary heanng was held at which 
Davidson explamed that a midden area is "that part of 
the site where we find the refuse [sic] from human 
activity [V]ery often bunals take place in that 
midden area, because it's easy to dig and areas 
that are soft and easy to dig in are very often places-
of repose-for humans... [V]ery often deaths, of 
course, take place m the winter time when lots of the 
available ground is frozen and even harder to dig, so 
those soft areas m the midden are very much utilized 
as bunals." The magistrate bound the defendants over 
on the refiled onginal charge, under section 
76-9-704(1 )(b), of disinterring a buned or otherwise 
interred dead body without authonty of a court order 
The magistrate specifically found that the State had 
shown probable cause to believe that the defendants 
disinterred human bones that had once been "buned 
or otherwise interred." However, the magistrate 
dismissed the second charge, based on section 76-9-
704(1 )(a) of the Code, of removing, concealmg, or 
failing to report the finding of a dead body to local 
law enforcement, or destroying a dead body or any 
part of it. He stated that: "There is no evidence that 
[the defendants] destroyed, concealed or removed a 
body or even a bone. The most that can be said is 
that they may have moved as many as seventeen 
bones a few feet. This is not removal, concealment 
or destruction." (Emphasis added) 
[1] % 9 The State sought permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal on the dismissal of the charge 
under section 76-9-704(1 )(a). The Redds did not 
appeal the bmdover on the refiled charge under 
section 76-9- 704(1 )(b) The court of appeals 
granted the State's petition and certified the case to 
this court. The court of appeals' certification order 
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stated that the appeal involved two issues the 
application and interpretation of Bnckey, and the 
interpretation and effect of sections 76-9-704(1 )(a) 
and (b) of the Code However, as noted above, the 
petition for interlocutory appeal did not address either 
Bnckey or 76-9-704(1 )(b), rather it raised only the 
interpretation of 76-9-704(1 )(a) Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 43(a) provides that the court of 
appeals may "certify a case for immediate transfer to 
the Supreme Court." Utah RApp P. 43(a) 
(emphasis added). It does not permit the court of 
appeals to add issues to the certification not present in 
the "case" before it. Here, the only issue appealed by 
the State is the dismissal of the section 76-9-704(1 )(a) 
charge. *990 This charge was not dismissed based 
on Bnckey, but rather because the magistrate 
interpreted the statute as not being violated by the 
movement of human bones. Therefore, we conclude 
that there is neither a Bnckey question nor a 
76-9-704(1 )(b) question before us. The only issue is 
the proper interpretation of section 76-9-704(1 )(a) of 
the Code. 
[2] ^ 10 We begin with the standard of review. The 
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
which we review for correctness, according no 
deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion. See 
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 
1998); State v. Pena, 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
With this standard in mind, we address section 
76-9-704( 1 )(a). It reads in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of a 
dead human body if the person intentionally and 
unlawfully: 
(a) removes, conceals, fails to report the finding 
of a dead body to a local law enforcement 
agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(1 )(a) (1995). [FN4] 
FN4 While this section has been amended, 
we apply the law as it existed at the time of 
the cnme charged. 
[3] f 11 We start our analysis with the statute's plain 
language. "The fundamental rule of statutory 
construction is that statutes are generally to be 
construed according to then: plam language. 
Unambiguous language m the statute may not be 
interpreted to contradict its plam meaning." Zoll & 
Branch P.C. v. Asay, 932 P 2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997) 
(citations omitted); see also Kimball Condo. Owners 
Ass'n v County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P 2d 642, 
648 (Utah 1997). In the case of unambiguous 
statutes, this court has a long history of relying on 
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning 
See, e g , Zoll & Branch, 932 P 2d at 594, Bryant v 
Deseret News Publ'g Co, 120 Utah 241, 233 P 2d 
355, 356 (1951). At least one part of 76-9- 704(1 )(a) 
is unambiguous* one violates the statute if one 
"removes a dead body" The magistrate found that 
while the Redds moved the bones, they did not 
"remove" them. To determine the correctness of this 
interpretation, we first resort to the dictionary The 
word "remove" is defined variously as "to change or 
shift the location, position, station, or residence o f 
and "to move by lifting, pushing aside or taking away 
or off." Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1921 (1961). Applying this definition to 
the statute, it seems clear that when the Redds took 
the bones out of the ground and moved them to the 
back dirt piles, they "removed" them within the plain 
meamng of the statute. Therefore, we find the 
magistrate's construction of the statute to have been m 
error. 
[4][5][6] f 12 The next question is whether the bones 
that the Redds removed constituted a "dead body." 
[FN5] The statute applies to one who "removes, 
conceals, fails to report the finding of a dead body to 
a local law enforcement agency, or destroys a dead 
body or any part of it." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-704(1 )(a) (1995). This clause can be read in 
two ways. First, it can be read as prohibiting only (I) 
the removal, concealment, or failure to report the 
finding of an intact dead body, or (n) the destruction 
of an intact dead body or a part of it. Under this 
reading, the negative implication is that the statute 
permits the removal, concealment, or failure to report 
the finding of body parts. Alternatively, the statute 
could be read as prohibiting (I) the removal, 
concealment, failure to report the finding of, or the 
destruction of (u) a dead body or any part of it. 
Where we are faced with two alternative readmgs, 
and we have no reliable sources that clearly fix the 
legislative purpose, we look to the consequences of 
those readmgs to determine the meamng to be given 
the statute. Our clear preference is the readmg that 
reflects sound public policy, as we presume that must 
be what the legislature mtended. See Schurtz v. 
BMW of North Amenca, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1113 
(Utah 1991). In other words, we interpret a statute to 
avoid absurd consequences. See Clover v Snowbird 
Ski Resort, *991 808 P2d 1037, 1045 n. 39 (Utah 
1991); see also Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P 2d 
1282, 1292 n. 24 (Utah 1993). 
FN5 Although this point was conceded by 
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the Redds' counsel before the court of 
appeals in the first case, we do not assume 
that concession is binding for the purposes 
of this appeal 
Deseret News Archives (recounting finding 
remains of American soldiers who died 52 
years earlier, were placed in metal boxes, 
and returned home) 
K 13 We conclude that the results produced by the 
first of the two readings proposed, which would 
restrict the statute's reach to intact human bodies and 
would not reach the removal, concealment, or failure 
to report the findmg of parts of bodies, such as heads, 
torsos, arms, legs, bones, or organs, is not in accord 
with any sound public policy Therefore, we adopt 
the second reading the statute prohibits the removal, 
concealment, failure to report the finding of, or the 
destruction of a dead body or any part of it 
% 14 On the facts of the present case, it may be that 
reading this statute as protectmg partial remains of a 
thousand-year-old Anasazi will not accord with the 
expectations of some persons, as the trial judge noted. 
See note 3, supra But a moment's reflection should 
demonstrate the soundness of the broader public 
policy our interpretation advances. It will protect the 
partial remains of many with whom people today can 
readily identify, such as pioneers buned long ago in 
crude graves, [FN6] or of war dead, [FN7] or of 
victims of horrendous accidents, [FN8] or crimes. 
[FN9] Certainly, these remains deserve protection, 
and we conclude that the legislature intended to grant 
it in section 76-9-704(1 )(a). 
FN6 See Conrad Walters, 'Modern 
Technology1 Saves Day in Salvaging Bones, 
Salt Lake Tribune, July 26, 1986, at Bl 
(discussing discovery of bones and teeth of 
early Mormon pioneer child buned in 
Fremont Indian midden); see also Paul 
Roily, Pioneers to Get New Graves, Salt 
Lake Tribune, August 16, 1986, at Bl ("The 
State Parks and Recreation Board has voted 
to rebury the remains of 32 early pioneers 
and Indians discovered near downtown Salt 
Lake City") 
FN7 See Associated Press, China Hands 
Over Remains of Airmen Killed in WWII, 
Deseret News, Jan. 17, 1997, available in 
FN8 See Associated Press, Did Deactivated 
Part Trigger Crash9, Deseret News, Nov 3, 
1999, available in Deseret News Archives 
("Authorities have publicly said they have 
found only one body and do not expect to 
find other bodies intact [from Egypt Air 
airplane crash]") 
FN9 See State v Hamilton, 827 P 2d 232, 
234 (Utah 1992) (recounting discovery of 
murder victim "Both hands, feet, and 
breasts, the head, and the left arm had been 
removed [0]fficers discovered breast 
tissue The other missing body parts were 
never recovered"), see also More Body 
Parts Found, Salt Lake Tribune, Nov 15, 
1999, at B2 ("After a two-day search, 
Duchesne County sheriffs deputies have 
found more body parts on the Pmder Ranch 
more than a year after the scattered remains 
of two bodies were found there The 
victims were shot and their bodies were 
blown up in an apparent attempt to destroy 
the evidence") 
[7] |^ 15 Because the Redds "removed" parts of a 
"dead body," and because the statute applies to body 
parts as well as whole bodies, we find the magistrate's 
interpretation of the statute to be in error. The Redds 
should have been bound over for trial under section 
76-9-704(l)(a)oftheCode. 
f 1 6 Reversed and remanded. 
t 17 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
DURHAM, Justice RUSSON, and Judge BENCH 
concur in Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
K 18 Having disqualified himself, Justice Stewart 
does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge 
Russell W Bench sat. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Anna Marie MORGAN, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 990377-CA. 
Feb. 25, 2000. 
Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial in the 
District Court, Murray Department, Joseph C. Fratto, 
Jr., J., of felony possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, and 
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, 
marijuana. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that state's apparently 
innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence 
required to obtain a bindover was not grounds for 
refiling the dismissed charges. 
Reversed. 
Greenwood, P.J., dissented and filed an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[11 Criminal Law <§=>1139 
110kll39 
[1] Criminal Law <®=>1158(1) 
HOkl 158(1) 
The trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion 
to dismiss the bindover order is subject to a 
bifurcated standard of review: the court's factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error, and the legal 
standard applied by the trial court is reviewed for 
correctness. 
[2] Indictment and Information <®=>45 
210k45 
State's failure to present the testimony of detective at 
original preliminary hearing, where detective was 
sworn and present but prosecutor apparently believed 
that sufficient evidence had been adduced through 
testimony of arresting officer, did not provide good 
cause for allowing state to refile charges after the 
magistrate dismissed the bindover for insufficient 
evidence at the original preliminary hearing. 
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[31 Constitutional Law <@=>265 
92k265 
Due process prohibits a prosecutor from refiling 
criminal charges, once dismissed for insufficiency of 
evidence, unless the prosecutor can show that either: 
(1) new or previously unavailable evidence has 
surfaced, or (2) that other good cause exists to justify 
refiling. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[4J Indictment and Information <®=>45 
210k45 
The innocent miscalculation of the quantum of 
evidence required to obtain a bindover is not grounds 
for refiling the dismissed charges unless new or 
previously unavailable evidence results from a 
nondilatory investigation prompted by realization of 
the miscalculation. 
*910 Kevin J. Kurumada, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Jan Graham and Keith Wilson, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, ORME, and 
WILKINS. [FN1] 
FN1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in 
this case and participated in its 
resolution prior to his swearing-in as a 
member of the Utah Supreme Court. 
OPINION 
WILKINS, Judge: 
f 1 Defendant Anna Marie Morgan appeals from a 
conviction of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37- 8(l)(a)(iii) (1998), and one 
count of possession of a controlled substance, 
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37- 8(2)(a)(i) (1998). We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 The defendant was charged with a single second 
degree felony count of possession of 
methamphetamine, a controlled substance, with intent 
to distribute, and a single misdemeanor count of 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
997 P 2d 910 
(Cite as: 997 P.2d 910, *910) 
Page 14 
possession of a different controlled substance, 
marijuana At the preliminary hearing on these 
charges, the state had two witnesses available One 
was *911 the arresting officer, Officer Lindquist; the 
other was Detective Hansen. Both were sworn as the 
hearing began, but only Lindquist was called to testify 
by the State Apparently believing that sufficient 
evidence had been adduced through the testimony of 
the arresting officer, the prosecutor did not call or 
examine his other witness. 
H 3 The magistrate concluded that insufficient 
evidence had been presented to bmd the defendant 
over on the charge of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and 
instead amended the charge to simple possession, and 
bound the defendant over on that charge. Upon 
heanng the magistrate's decision, the prosecutor 
indicated that he had assumed the arresting officer's 
testimony would be sufficient, and sought to 
introduce the additional testimony of Detective 
Hansen who was still present in the courtroom and 
already sworn. The magistrate denied this request, 
apparently on the grounds that having already entered 
the bmdover order, he had no further jurisdiction in 
the matter, it havmg devolved upon the district court. 
U 4 The State sought to reopen the heanng, or in the 
alternative to have the magistrate dismiss the charges 
so that they could be refiled for purposes of obtaining 
a new preliminary hearing. The magistrate denied the 
motion to reopen the preliminary heanng, but granted 
the motion to dismiss the charges without prejudice to 
the State's opportunity to refile. [FN2] 
FN2 No explanation is offered for the 
inconsistency in the magistrate's initial 
belief that he had no further jurisdiction to 
reopen the preliminary heanng, and his later 
implicit conclusion that he retained enough 
authonty to dismiss the charges. 
U 5 The prosecutor filed a new information charging 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distnbute and possession of manjuana, the same 
charges as onginally filed against the defendant A 
new preliminary heanng was held before the same 
magistrate, and both the arresting officer, Lindquist, 
and the other witness, Detective Hansen, testified. 
No additional witnesses were presented by the State. 
Based upon this testimony, the magistrate bound the 
defendant over on both charges. Before the distnct 
court, defendant moved to quash the bmdover order, 
which motion was denied. 
f 6 A jury found defendant guilty Defendant 
appeals 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 7 On appeal, the defendant raises two issues. 
First, defendant claims that the tnal court erred in 
denying her motion to dismiss the bmdover order 
Second, she claims ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 
Inasmuch as we reverse on the first issue, we need not 
reach the second. 
[1] H 8 The tnal court's decision to deny defendant's 
motion to dismiss is subject to a bifurcated standard 
of review: the court's factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error, and the legal standard applied by the 
tnal court is reviewed for correctness. "On review, 
we give no deference to the tnal court's determination 
that defendant's due process nghts were not violated; 
however, we presume that the factual findings 
underlying that determination are correct." State v. 
Pana, 972 P 2d 924, 926-27 (Utah Ct App.1998). 
ANALYSIS 
[2] K 9 The issue presented by the defendant is 
relatively simple: Under circumstances such as those 
presented here, is the prosecutor at liberty under Utah 
law to refile the charges against the defendant in 
order to secure a second preliminary heanng? Our 
answer is that the prosecutor is not. 
f 10 Our decision turns on our understanding of State 
v Bnckey, 714 P 2d 644 (Utah 1986). Bnckey arose 
under similar circumstances. Keith Bnckey was 
charged with forcible sexual assault. At the first 
preliminary heanng on the charge, the prosecutor 
called the victim as a witness and presented her 
testimony relating to the charge. At the close of the 
evidence, the defense moved to dismiss citmg the 
State's failure to introduce any evidence that Bnckey 
had acted without the victim's consent, an element 
*912 necessary for establishing a prima facie case. 
The magistrate agreed and dismissed. 
K 11 The prosecutor in Bnckey subsequently refiled 
the charge and a second preliminary heanng was 
conducted before a different magistrate. The victim 
again testified, as did her father, who had been 
present dunng the first heanng but was not called to 
testify. Bnckey objected to the second preliminary 
heanng m part on the ground that the father's 
testimony did not constitute "new evidence" since 
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what he testified to was known to the prosecutor at 
the time of the first hearing, and the father had then 
been present in the courtroom. The magistrate 
disagreed, and bound defendant over. The district 
court also disagreed, denying Brickey's motion to 
quash the bindover. 
U 12 The supreme court, however, agreed with 
Brickey that "due process considerations prohibit a 
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the 
prosecutor can show that new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good 
cause justifies refiling." Id. at 647. In a footnote, the 
supreme court also noted that the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, whose analysis it followed, had 
held in Harper v. District Ct, 484 P.2d 891 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1971), that good cause to continue a 
preliminary hearing for further investigation might 
exist when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the 
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover 
and further investigation clearly would not be 
dilatory. See Harper, 484 P.2d at 897. 
% 13 In this case, the State urges us to adopt a broad 
reading of "other good cause" justifying refiling, and 
relies upon the claim of innocent miscalculation of 
the quantum of evidence required to bind the 
defendant over. The State correctly notes that 
improper forum shopping has been avoided in this 
instance by both preliminary hearings being held 
before the same magistrate. As such, it argues, the 
only issue is whether or not good cause for refiling 
exists here. 
f 14 The State makes no claim that the testimony 
elicited from Detective Hansen at the second 
preliminary hearing differs in any way from what he 
would have given if called at the first hearing. The 
testimony of Officer Lindquist at the second hearing 
contained no suggestion of new or previously 
unavailable evidence. The only difference in the 
State's case at the two preliminary hearings seems to 
be the failure to call the present and sworn detective 
at the first, and absence of that failure at the second. 
No claim of evidence presented at the second hearing 
as having been the result of further investigation has 
been made, nor has there been any other suggestion 
that the evidence given by Detective Hansen at the 
second preliminary hearing was in any way new or 
unavailable at the first hearing. 
[3] % 15 Our reading of Brickey does not support the 
State's argument. Brickey prohibits a prosecutor 
from refiling criminal charges, once dismissed for 
insufficiency of evidence, unless the prosecutor can 
show that either (1) new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced, or (2) that other good cause 
exists to justify refiling. The State does not claim, 
nor could it, that new or previously unavailable 
evidence surfaced between the first preliminary 
hearing and the refiling of the charges against the 
defendant. Furthermore, given this first and most 
direct requirement, it seems illogical to suggest that 
evidence that was both known and available at the 
first preliminary hearing could constitute "other good 
cause." Other good cause, as described in Brickey, 
must at a minimum be something beyond the 
introduction of a witness who was present in the 
courtroom, sworn, and ready to testify at the first 
preliminary hearing, whose testimony is known at the 
time and does not change in any material way after 
the initial bindover is dismissed. 
[4] 1| 16 Brickey has long been regarded as a 
meaningful limitation on the refiling of charges. The 
circumstances of this case, if treated as "good cause" 
for refiling, would simply eviscerate that limitation. 
Consequently, until and unless our supreme court 
directs otherwise, the innocent miscalculation of the 
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover is 
not grounds for refiling the dismissed charges unless 
new or previously *913 unavailable evidence results 
from a nondilatory investigation prompted by 
realization of the miscalculation. 
CONCLUSION 
f 17 Due process considerations prohibit a 
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges against a 
defendant when the prosecutor has available in court 
at the preliminary hearing sufficient evidence to 
support the bindover, but fails to present it to the 
magistrate. Once the magistrate dismisses the 
bindover for insufficient evidence, the prosecutor 
must be able to show that new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good 
cause justifies refiling. Evidence or witnesses 
previously known, available and unpresented by the 
prosecutor without justification do not constitute 
good cause. 
U 18 Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
H 191 CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
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H 20 I respectfully dissent from my colleagues. The 
majority opinion accurately sets forth the relevant 
facts and applicable law, however, I conclude the 
facts of this case demonstrate that the State innocently 
miscalculated the quantum of evidence required by 
the magistrate for bindover and as such provided 
"other good cause" as referred to in State v Bnckey, 
714 P 2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). 
K 21 While the facts of this case are similar to those 
in Bnckey, they do not present any of the due process 
problems identified therein. In this case, 
immediately after the magistrate stated there was 
insufficient evidence to bmd defendant over on the 
distribution charge, the prosecutor asked to reopen 
the preliminary hearing and present Detective 
Hansen's testimony When the magistrate denied the 
prosecutor's request to reopen the preliminary hearing 
and dismissed the charges, the prosecutor promptly 
refiled the charges and a new preliminary heanng 
occurred before the same magistrate, as required by 
Bnckey. See id. Therefore, there is no evidence of 
either harassment of defendant or forum shopping by 
the prosecutor. 
T| 22 The State does not assert that Detective 
Hansen's testimony constitutes new or previously 
unavailable evidence, arguing instead that this 
situation falls under the "other good cause" prong of 
the Bnckey test. Neither Bnckey nor later Utah 
decisions specifically descnbe what situations 
constitute "other good cause" justifying a prosecutor's 
decision to refile charges. However, Bnckey 
suggests that "good cause to continue a preliminary 
hearing for further investigation might exist when a 
prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of 
evidence required to obtain a bindover and further 
investigation clearly would not be dilatory." See id. 
at 647 n. 5 (discussmg holding in Harper v. Distnct 
Ct, 484 P 2d 891 (Okla 1971)), see also Walker v 
Schneider, 477 N W 2d 167, 175 (N D 1991) 
(explaining good cause may include innocent 
miscalculation of amount of evidence by prosecutor) 
On this basis, it is likely the magistrate could have 
reopened the preliminary heanng and heard 
additional evidence 
U 23 In my view, the magistrate and subsequently the 
tnal court properly determined that, under the facts of 
this case, the "other good cause" prong of the Bnckey 
test was satisfied, thus allowing refiling charges 
Although the basis of Detective Hansen's testimony 
was known by the prosecutor and available at the 
time of the first preliminary heanng, the evidence was 
qualitatively different than the evidence actually 
presented at the first preliminary heanng. Detective 
Hansen's testimony supplied the magistrate with the 
foundation necessary to assess whether the amount of 
drugs found in defendant's car met probable cause 
requirements for the distnbution charge. The 
prosecutor had initially innocently miscalculated the 
need for "both officers' testimony, assuming that 
Officer Lindquist's testimony would be sufficient. 
As noted in Bnckey, double jeopardy provisions did 
not preclude refiling charges. See Bnckey, 714 P 2d 
at 646. Only "[considerations of fundamental 
fairness" embodied in constitutional protections of 
due process bar subsequent indictment. Id. at *914 
647. Based on the facts of this case, the magistrate 
and tnal court did not err in concluding that "good 
cause" justified refiling the charges. Under these 
circumstances, I believe that refiling the charges did 
not violate defendant's due process nghts and that this 
case presents a reasonable and logical application of 
Bnckey. Therefore, I would affirm. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
P,L£C
 JiJM 0 3 2Ck 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
 0L£aK 0_Thg CCJfl 
3T—~——-— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JAMES REDD and 
JEANNE REDD, 
Defendants. 
Ocputy 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 9817-063 
9817-064 
Honorable Mary L. Manley 
This matter is currently before the District Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or 
Quash Bindover. 
HISTOfiY 
A Preliminary Hearing was held on October 8,1998 on the charges of Abuse or 
Desecration of a Dead Human Body, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Section 76-9-704(1) 
and/or (l)(f) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended and Trespassing on Trust Lands, a 
Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Section 53C-2-301(l)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. The violations were alleged to have occurred on January 6, 1996. A previous 
information alleging violations of the desecration statute was dismissed after Preliminary 
Hearing held on March 20,1997. Thereafter, an appeal followed. The Magistrate's dismissal 
was upheld on appeal, but on the alternate premise that the State had not presented sufficient 
evidence of the element of burial. The State filed a Petition for Rehearing which was denied. 
However, in its ruling denying the Petition for Rehearing, the Court of Appeals stated in a 
footnote that "No party to this action should construe our opinion or this order to preclude the 
State from refiling the charges under the same or a more appropriate subsection of the statute." 
Thereafter, the pending Information was filed alleging a violation of an additional subsection of 
76-9-704 along with the previously alleged violations. The magistrate issued a written bindover 
ruling dismissing subsection 76-9-704(1) and binding the defendants over on the remaining 
charges. An appeal was taken from the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
magistrate's dismissal and remanded the case. This motion is in response to the refiling of 
charges after the first dismissal. 
ISSUE 
The issue before the Court is a narrow one: Is there new or previously unavailable 
evidence or other good cause that permits the refiling of charges after dismissal at Preliminary 
Hearing? 
ANALYSIS 
In the case of State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah 
held that for due process considerations, unless there was new or previously unavailable evidence 
or other good cause, that charges could not be refiled after a dismissal at preliminary hearing. In 
the present case, the magistrate in his Ruling for Bindover made the following finding regarding 
new evidence: 
"Everything Dale Davidson said on October 8, 1998, could have been said on 
March 20,1997. The evidence of Mr. Kuwanwisiwma with respect to the key 
issue is substantially the same as that of Mr. Davidson. Thus, the Brickev 
exception for new or previously unavailable evidence does not apply here." 
The court left open whether or not the "other good cause" prong of Brickev was 
applicable. In doing so, the court made the following accurate observation: 
"Brickev does suggest that a prosecutor's initial miscalculation of the quantum of 
evidence might justify refiling. Here, however, it is not the quantum of evidence 
that was miscalculated, but the nature of the evidence. The state did not fail to 
present enough evidence on March 20, 1997, to prove a dead body had been 
buried; it presented none.M 
Thus, the only remaining question is whether or not failure to present sufficient evidence 
at the Preliminary Hearing meets the requirements of the "other good cause" prong of Brickey. 
Subsequent to the magistrate's ruling, the case of State v Morgan, 2000 UT App 389, was 
decided. In Morgan the court commented and held: 
"Brickey has long been regarded as a meaningful limitation on the refiling of 
charges. The circumstances of this case, if treated as 'good cause1 for refiling, 
would simply eviscerate that limitation. Consequently, until and unless our 
supreme court directs otherwise, the innocent miscalculation of the quantum of 
evidence required to obtain a bindover is not grounds for refiling the dismissed 
charges " 
Lack of new evidence and innocent miscalculation as to the evidence required to obtain 
a bindover are the two areas that Brickey and Morgan together set forth as insufficient grounds to 
permit a refiling of charges after dismissal. It is those very claims that the state sets forth in this 
case. While the practical application of these cases may be unduly restrictive on the prosecution, 
in light of Brickey and Morgan, this court is compelled to grant the Defendants' Motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charges are dismissed. 
DATED this ^ | day of June, 2000. 
"inn-J " w 
District Court Judg 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed/hand delivered true and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Rod W. Snow 
Dixon and Snow, P.C. 
425 S. Cherry, Suite 1000 
Denver, CO 80246-1236 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 937 
Moab, UT. 84532 
William Benge 
Deputy County Attorney - Pro Tern 
125 E. Center 
Moab.UT. 84532 
DATED the R " day of June, 2000. 
